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Abstract 
This paper presents the military rationale for developing an 
improved understanding of the effects of culture on the 
performance of military organizations and their partners.  In 
particular the change from conventional high intensity war-
fare to asymmetric warfare increases the interactions 
between different cultures within multi-national military 
forces and in the local populations.  A brief description of 
culture and cultural attributes is presented.  A culture-based 
evaluation tool (the Soft Factors Modeling Tool), which has 
been developed by the authors, is described. 
Introduction 
Research and development activities in the civilian sector 
have produced a range of systems, products and areas of 
knowledge that in many cases could benefit military 
systems.  In order to exploit this, the UK Ministry of 
Defence has funded the creation of a number of Defence 
Technology Centres in the UK, in order to capture the best 
of both military and civilian developments and to 
implement them to improve defense technology and 
defense systems.  The research work reported in this paper 
is funded by the UK’s Systems Engineering for 
Autonomous Systems Defence Technology Centre (SEAS 
DTC).   
 There is an increasing recognition of the potentially 
deleterious effects of incompatible individual and organiz-
ational cultures on complex systems and organizations.  In 
the case of the military, these effects are exacerbated by the 
increasing involvement of multinational forces and non-
governmental organizations as the World moves into an era 
of ‘asymmetric warfare’. Two quotes from the National 
Academies Report “Human Behavior in Military Contexts’ 
(Flascovich & Hartel 2008) capture the problem:  
The ability to navigate and adapt to different cultures 
is known as intercultural competence or cultural 
intelligence … thus a key issue for the military is to 
select, train and deploy individuals who possess these 
qualities and are able to function in multiple cultures. 
Note that the key word for this research is ‘deploy’. 
…modern conflicts such as the one in Iraq often 
involve more protracted engagement with local 
inhabitants and are rife with opportunities for inter-
cultural misunderstandings. 
Military rationale 
Major changes are occurring to the post Cold War environ-
ments in which the British, American and other Western 
armed forces are operating.  These changes and the 
requirements they place on Western armed forces are 
described briefly in this section. 
The increasing frequency of asymmetric warfare 
In military terms, the USA is now virtually unchall-
engeable.  In terms of nuclear and conventional high inten-
sity warfare capability, it has acquired such dominance that 
it is unlikely to be challenged directly in the foreseeable 
future.  However, this hegemony, by limiting the military 
options of would-be foes, has forced them to select alter-
native, indirect, asymmetric approaches.  In particular, this 
has come to mean some form of ‘complex irregular 
warfare’ (International Institute for Strategic Studies, 
2005). 
 In 1999, Chinese military planners published a book 
entitled ‘Unrestricted Warfare’ (Qiao & Wang, 1999).  
This book described a range of tactics that developing 
countries could adopt during a war in order to compensate 
for their military inferiority compared to the USA.  The 
book also predicted a variety of asymmetric attacks against 
the USA, listing examples that included the bombing of the 
World Trade Center, attacks by bin Laden and hacking into 
(civilian) networks.  The book was published in the West 
in 2002 (Qiao & Wang 2002).  During the late 1990s and 
the first two years of the new millennium, the USA had 
been embarking on a transformation of its military 
capability based on ever-smarter technology, involving 
space assets, precision weapons, reductions in conventional 
forces, etc.  The 9/11 attacks (of 2001) against the U.S. 
provided a timely warning that these nascent transfor-
mations represented a costly mistake, and enabled the U.S. 
military to adjust to at least some extent to the new threats 
of asymmetric/complex irregular warfare. 
 Following the 9/11 attacks, Western strategists have 
realized that the West will not only face asymmetric 
warfare threats from terrorists based in ‘failed states’, but 
also from developing countries such as China, which have 
already tested and evaluated asymmetric warfare capa-
bilities (Schneider 2007, Norton-Taylor 2007).   The West 
cannot circumvent these asymmetric threats by using proxy 
forces abroad, as Western countries are easy to enter due to 
their ethnic mix, liberal laws, transport links, etc., their 
financial systems, services and civilians are easily attacked, 
and their populations are for the most part unused to 
internal threats.  It is therefore generally accepted that it 
will be necessary to project force wherever the perceived 
enemy is detected. 
 Hoffman (2006) presents a valuable analysis of the U.S. 
military, its limited reactions to-date to the increasing 
asymmetric threats, and the requirements for further 
change to enable it to meet these threats.  In a later article 
(Hoffman 2007), he describes the future scenario of 
‘hybrid wars’, in which politically and ideologically-
motivated opponents use modern information networks and 
weapons to attack the West’s weak points.  
 Krause (2007) presents an Australian perspective on the 
changing form of warfare.  He states that asymmetric 
warfare, in its various forms, is likely to be the dominant 
form of combat in the future.  Adversaries will exploit the 
West’s weaknesses, including the media (which magnifies 
Western casualties and operational errors) and the squeam-
ishness of Western public opinion which hamstrings the 
actions of its military forces, but not the actions of 
asymmetric opposition forces.   
A need for changes in Western military forces 
Hoffman (2006) considers that the USA’s military reform 
programs are still too influenced by the former assump-
tions of high intensity warfare.  In the future, forces are 
likely to arrive in an austere environment and have to fight 
immediately, rather than rely on well-equipped fixed bases. 
 One of Krause’s key conclusions is that the primary 
training programs for Western armies must be for asym-
metric warfare, rather than for high intensity conventional 
warfare as at present; asymmetric warfare cannot be left to 
the various nations’ Special Forces (Krause 2007).  Multi-
national forces will have to acquire a good understanding 
of each others’ cultures and modes of operation, as well as 
the cultures and preferences of the populations and a range 
of non-governmental organizations with which they have 
to operate and collaborate. 
 The Western soldier will in future operate increasingly 
in vulnerable situations, where he or she is always effec-
tively on the front line, facing surprise attack, hostage-
taking and arbitrary changes in local alliances amongst 
armed groups who use the civilian population to shield 
themselves.  It is important to reduce the risks that this 
soldier faces, wherever possible; this risk reduction will 
come about via more appropriate training, improved 
weaponry and physical protection and improved infor-
mation (via networks, surveillance systems, etc.). 
 Based on more than fifty years experience of anti-
terrorist activities at home and abroad, the UK Ministry of 
Defence is well aware of many of the issues associated 
with low-level asymmetric warfare, including the effects of 
mounting military casualty levels and attacks against 
civilians on home soil.  It is unlikely that the UK will be 
able to recruit significantly more soldiers in the future and, 
in order to meet the increasing commitment to asymmetric 
warfare, it must improve the relevant capabilities of exis-
ting soldiers, provide appropriate technologies to protect 
them and minimize the need for risk taking. 
 The UK Ministry of Defence believes that much greater 
reliance must, in the future, be placed on unmanned 
systems for surveillance, communications, targeting and as 
weapon platforms. 
The project 
The Systems Engineering for Autonomous Systems 
Defence Technology Centre (SEAS DTC) is the fourth 
DTC to be established by the UK’s Ministry of Defence.  
The DTC carries out research into autonomous systems 
and sub-systems, with the intention of injecting the resul-
tant technologies into unmanned military systems, in par-
ticular, autonomous and semi-autonomous vehicles that 
can reduce the hazards and costs associated with human 
operators. 
 Although much greater reliance will be placed in the 
future on unmanned systems, it is expected that humans 
will retain the ultimate responsibility for control and 
decision making with regard to the operational deployment 
of such systems.  However, the position of the control 
interface and the allocation of decision-making autonomy 
to such a system will vary depending on the embedded 
intelligence within the overall system, task requirements, 
context, etc.  
 It is recognized within the SEAS DTC that personal 
culture and organizational culture have a significant effect 
on the effectiveness of military units.  Therefore, the DTC 
is funding research projects covering cultural issues – the 
work of one such project, Impact of Different Cultural 
Attribute Sets on Semi/Autonomous System Decision Struc-
tures and Interfaces, is the main focus of this paper. 
 One of the first tasks of the above research project was 
to carry out a major review of the literature related to 
culture and its effects, in particular with regard to the 
military (Siemieniuch & Meese 2006).  The outputs of this 
survey covered twenty-four topics, including: 
• What is culture? 
• National culture 
• Professional culture 
• Organizational culture 
• Military culture 
• Cross-cultural operations 
• Transforming culture 
• Cultural dimensions 
 These outputs provided an essential guide to the sub-
sequent activities of the research project.   
Research aims of the project 
The research described in this paper is intended to develop 
innovative ways of evaluating the effects of culture on the 
performance of semi-autonomous/autonomous systems, 
and the performance of various combinations of military 
and non-governmental organisations.  
 A tool that can evaluate individual, group and organi-
sation cultures and compare these against environmental/-
mission and behavioural requirements will not only aid the 
evaluation of the appropriateness of existing combinations 
of humans and technological systems, but will also assist in 
the selection of combinations for new scenarios and 
missions. 
Cultural scenarios of interest 
There are five key areas where culture has a particular role 
to play; these are described below: 
1. Increasingly powerful soldiers:  The advent of 
advanced autonomous and semi-autonomous systems is 
putting greater power than ever before in the hands of indi-
vidual soldiers, and it is important that they make approp-
riate decisions with regard to the use of such power; indiv-
idual, group and organizational culture play a significant 
part in such soldiers’ effectiveness. 
2. Effects-based operations and force packaging:  UK 
and US forces are moving towards ‘effects-based 
operations’, where performance measures are based on the 
achievement of objectives, not the provision of fire power. 
Dorman (2008) describes the experience of the UK in its 
ongoing transformation to effects-based operations.  ‘Force 
packaging’ (modular, self-contained sets of units borrowed 
from the various commands for a given mission) is an 
important contributor to this approach.  Force packages can 
be assembled at short notice to form a mix of force 
appropriate for the specific demands of an unforeseen 
crisis demanding the use of armed forces.  In the network-
enabled capability (NEC) battle space, interoperability 
across these units is critical to effective collaboration and 
decision-making among different service cultures, which 
have been brought together at very short notice to deal with 
a crisis situation. 
3. Multinational and non-governmental organisations:  
Multinational forces are increasingly being deployed, typi-
cally working alongside non-governmental organisations 
(NGOs) and operating in conflict, peace-making and 
peace-keeping roles.  However, the various organisations 
come from and operate within different cultural contexts 
and, as systems, will exhibit a range of cultural attributes 
which impact on decision making and decision execution 
processes and thereby increase the likelihood of disagree-
ments and misunderstandings in communicating and 
implementing ‘commander’s intent’.  
4. Local populations:  Military forces are spending ever 
longer in foreign countries.  To achieve success, they need 
to interact in culturally sensitive ways with the local popu-
lations of the host countries in order to move on from inter-
vention to engagement.  
5. The development of semi/autonomous systems: The 
development, implementation and use of technology, such 
as semi/autonomous systems (S/AS), do not occur in a 
vacuum.  Designers make their own culturally-biased 
assumptions about user requirements and expectations.  
Organisational and military research shows that technology 
tends to be adopted by users for their own purposes, and 
exactly how it is used is heavily influenced by the extant 
organisational culture. 
Cultural perspectives 
Culture is a major and, to-date, underestimated factor in the 
performance of any complex system.  Cultural effects can 
be examined at the level of the individual, the team, the 
organization; however, culture also affects the design of 
systems (whether or not they contain humans).  Hofstede’s 
1984 definition of culture is regarded by the research team 
as a useful ‘working basis’:  
Culture is “the collective programming of the mind 
which distinguishes the members of one human group 
from another ... includes systems of values; and values 
are among the building blocks of culture.” 
Hofstede (1991) states that there are three broad perspec-
tives on culture, as depicted in Figure 1. 
Figure 1: Hofstede’s perspectives on culture 
 
 The perspectives that are amenable to change are at the 
individual and the collective culture levels.  Hofstede uses 
the term ‘cultural values’ where value is seen as ‘a broad 
tendency to prefer certain states of affairs over others’.  In 
this project the term ‘cultural attributes’ has been used to 
describe a set of high level culture-related features, the 
values of which can be used to describe individuals and 
systems (including technical systems). 
 The Loughborough University research team has 
decided to focus on three widely accepted classes of 
culture, each of which could individually and collectively 
influence the set of cultural attributes exhibited by an 
individual or a collective such at a team, organization or 
system.  
 
INDIVIDUAL 
COLLECTIVE 
UNIVERSAL 
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individual 
    behavior, values 
• Common 
• Genetic 
• Pre-programmed, 
   e.g. laughing, 
    weeping, aggression 
• Shared 
• Learned, e.g. national, 
professional 
   & organizational culture 
National culture 
National culture is usually a product of heritage (religion, 
history, language, climate, population density, availability 
of resources, politics, etc.).  The following can vary accor-
ding to national culture and can therefore shape expecta-
tions and performance: 
• Leadership styles (hierarchical vs. consultative) 
• Superior – inferior relationships (accept vs. question 
decisions) 
• Communication styles (direct and specific vs. indirect 
and non-specific) 
• Reading emotional reaction (showing reaction, emotion 
or aggression vs. hiding reaction) 
• Following vs. breaking rules 
Professional culture 
Professional culture is usually manifested in its members 
by a sense of community and by the bonds of a common 
identity (Helmreich & Merritt, 1998). Attributes of 
professional culture can include: 
• Members have specific expertise and a shared profess-
ional jargon 
• Norms for behavior and common, binding ethical values 
• Selectivity and competition for entry 
• Prestige and status with badges or defining uniform 
• Extensive training requirements 
• Professional and gender stereotyping 
• Status differentials 
• Self-regulation 
• Institutional and individual resistance to imposed change 
• Reluctance to admit error and denial of ‘vulnerability’ 
• Reduced awareness of personal limitations 
Organizational culture 
There are two layers of organizational culture: 
• Formal, surface, visible structures, including members’ 
uniforms, symbols, routines, documents, etc. 
• Informal, inner, invisible layer, including values, beliefs, 
subconscious assumptions. 
Organizational culture is more amenable to influence than 
professional or national culture and it is organizational cul-
ture that effectively channels the effects of the other two 
cultures into standard working practices.   Organizational 
culture is also unique, and what works in one organization 
may not work in another, and may not work at a different 
branch of the same organization.  Factors thought to 
influence or engender organizational culture include:  
• Reduced awareness of personal limitations 
• Strong corporate identity such as the nature of the product 
and market in which the organization operates 
• Effective leadership - moral association or belief in the 
organization’s mission and products 
• High morale and trust - confidence e.g. in quality and 
safety practices, management communication and 
feedback 
• Cohesive team working and cooperation 
• Job security 
• Development & training 
• Degree of empowerment 
Cultural attributes  
It is the view of the researchers that, in contrast to most 
work on culture, some of the cultural attributes described 
in this section can be exhibited by technical elements such 
as intelligent software agents, as well as by humans.  Since 
systems comprise both technical and non-technical elem-
ents, the technical components of semi/autonomous sys-
tems will also need to demonstrate appropriate decision-
making behaviors and an ability to perform in particular 
environments. 
 Technical sub-systems or agents are designed by 
humans, and it is inevitable that positions on the cultural 
attribute pairings will, in many cases be inherent in the 
design of these technical subsystems, in particular where 
there is intelligence in the sub-system.   
Overview of the chosen cultural attributes 
As stated earlier, the research team carried out an in-depth 
state-of-the-art review.  Based on the outputs of the review, 
an initial set of cultural attribute pairing was selected and 
incorporated into the first prototype of what is currently 
called the Soft Factors Modeling Tool. 
 Based on expert evaluation and further research these 
attributes have been modified and system cultural profiles 
are now assessed via ten culture attribute pairings, of 
which five can only be exhibited by the human agents in a 
system; the other five attributes can be exhibited by both 
human (i.e. non-technical) and technical (i.e. software-
based) agents within a system, as indicated in Figure 2.  
 The project researchers believe that there is an 
identifiable relationship between the configuration of 
cultural attributes exhibited by a system (comprising both 
human and technical agents and components) and the 
performance of that system in a particular environment. 
 Cultural attributes can relate to the perceptions of a 
single agent (e.g. an individual or missile launcher), a 
group of sub-systems (a troop or a communications infra-
structure) or an overall system (the army or the set of assets 
carrying out a mission).  Each attribute pairing defines a 
range, with a description of the likely beliefs, perceptions, 
etc., manifested at each end.  Individuals, groups or sys-
tems will select a position towards one end or the other, but 
rarely occupy the absolute extremes in all contexts.  It 
should be remembered that the attribute ranges, of them-
selves, do not imply right or wrong, merely that the attri-
bute value is more or less appropriate given a required 
level of performance in a particular environment. 
 
Figure 2: Cultural attribute pairings 
 There is insufficient space to present detailed descrip-
tions of all ten attribute pairings, therefore only three 
examples are provided below.  Further details of most of 
these are provided in Johnson et al. (2007).  
Individualism vs. collectivism:  This refers to the balance 
struck between individuals and groups.  In individualistic 
societies, ties between individuals (other than immediate 
family members) are loose; each person takes responsibil-
ity for his or her actions; individualists tend to speak 
directly and factually, and are willing to argue and to 
question others’ views.  Generally, individualists tend to 
exhibit a higher level of trust than collectivists.  In 
collectivistic societies, individuals are integrated into 
closely knit groups, often in the form of extended families; 
in return for unquestioning loyalty, they gain the protection 
of their group.  People from outside the group tend to be 
treated with suspicion.  Collectivists try to avoid direct, 
confrontational approaches and find criticizing others 
difficult.  Hierarchies tend to be rigid, and losing face is to 
be avoided at all costs. 
Proactive vs. orthodox:  This refers to the application of 
doctrine, taught strategy and standard procedures vs. the 
need to adapt or create procedures to fit exceptional 
circumstances.  Proactive implies that local characteristics 
can justify exceptions, where new local versions of rules 
and procedures should be generated and applied rather than 
force-fitting existing ones, e.g. for special force operations 
or some diplomatic/peace-keeping operations.  Orthodox 
implies that broad or general formalized rules of operation 
are available and mandatory; the requirement is to find the 
best fit.  This approach is useful for larger operations 
where cohesion over tactics and orders is critical. 
High risk-taking vs. low risk-taking: This refers to the 
level of willingness and ability to take risks to achieve 
operational goals.  High risk-taking implies an acceptance 
or relish of the unpredictable in military operations - being 
able to manage and react to chaotic events, a willingness or 
ability to bend or break rules and accept the consequences, 
an ability to think and evaluate the unthinkable.  Low risk-
taking implies a respect for and acceptance of the need and 
importance of doctrine, strategy and standard operating 
procedures (SOPs), a more cautious approach to new situa-
tions, absence of the ‘hero’ factor, desire for a long-term 
stable career, preference for predictable, coherent app-
roaches, great concern for possible consequences.  
 Note that military planners tend to differentiate between 
risk-taking (where there are fall-back options) and taking 
chances (where the cost of failure may be extremely high 
for the organization). 
The Soft Factors Modeling Tool 
The Loughborough researchers have developed a web-
based prototype tool - the Soft Factors Modeling Tool 
(SFMT); this incorporates the cultural attribute pairings 
described in the previous section. 
The latest version of the SFMT, although not yet complete, 
enables individuals and representatives of subsystems (e.g. 
teams, squads, platoons, command & control (C2)) to input 
estimates of their positions with regard to each of the 
cultural attribute pairings.  These positions are converted 
into numeric values and, when all data has been entered, 
feedback is presented to the user(s) in graphical format to 
highlight any conflicts between cultural attributes at the 
various system levels.  So, for example the tool could be 
used by an individual or group who would review each of 
the assets under consideration for a particular mission and, 
by entering values against each of the cultural attributes 
will be able to generate a cultural profile of those assets.  
The tool will crunch the numbers and then highlight:  
• Any similarities or conflicts in cultural attribute values 
that exist between the various assets 
• Areas where particular assets may show a cultural 
attribute value that will facilitate or inhibit a desired 
behavior or ability to operate in a selected environment 
The target end-users of the final version of the tool are 
mission planners who are required to put together a system 
(comprising human and technical components) to carry out 
an operational requirement in a particular environment.  
For example the tool can help answer the question ‘Is a 
particular configuration of military assets tasked with 
carrying out a mission capable of demonstrating approp-
riate decision-making, information processing, communi-
cation, adaptive skills &  behavior in an environment 
where the  command style is control free, authority is 
delegated, operational tempo is unpredictable and the battle 
space is ill-defined?’ 
 Figure 3 illustrates a screen dump from an earlier 
version of the SFMT as the user is about to enter data 
about the sixth of ten attribute pairings. On completion of 
data entry for all ten attribute value pairings, the data is 
then processed by an analysis engine, and the results 
displayed using a simple traffic light system, as described 
later in this paper. 
Mastery Fatalism 
Proactive Orthodox 
Information integration Information analysis 
Time synchronization Time sequencing 
Individualism Collectivism 
Universalism Particularism 
Hunter-gatherer Nurturer 
Power by achievement Power by status 
High power distance Low power distance index 
High risk-taking Low risk-taking 
Attributable to 
human agents 
Attributable to 
human and 
technical agents 
 Figure 3:  SFMT data gathering tool 
 Note that the data gathering tool and analysis engine 
have not yet been updated to the latest SFMT version.  An 
earlier (draft) version of the tool has been available at 
http://www-staff.lboro.ac.uk/~ttgaln/Culture_web for some 
months.  The modifications to produce the current version 
of the SFMT are based on initial feedback from a range of 
users and an analysis of the data collected. 
Impact of cultural attributes on behavior 
As already stated, a basic hypothesis of the research is that 
particular combinations of cultural attributes facilitate or 
inhibit certain types of decision-making behavior.  For 
example, if a training assessor must have a communication 
behavior that includes stating factually his/her assessment 
of trainees’ performances, then an agent occupying a pos-
ition towards the collectivism end of the individualism vs. 
collectivism spectrum would not be an ideal candidate. 
 Table 1 illustrates a section of a spreadsheet that lists on 
the left a range of skill classes and, within these, behaviors.  
Cultural attribute pairs are listed across the spreadsheet and 
scored, although only one of these pairings, individualism 
vs. collectivism, is shown due to space limitations. The 
third and fifth columns of Table 1 indicate the capabilities 
of collectivism and individualism to achieve the various 
behaviors.  Differing combinations of behaviors would be 
required for effective decision-making in various combat, 
peacemaking and peacekeeping situations. 
 The analysis engine evaluates the values input for the 
cultural attribute pairs against each of the classes of beh-
avior of Table 1.  A simple traffic light display system has 
been utilized for the software outputs - green implies that a 
position in this part of the pairing will facilitate the desired 
behavior, amber implies that the effect on the desired 
behavior is not clear or is neutral and red implies that a 
position in this part of the pairing will inhibit the ability of 
an agent or system to exhibit the desired behavior.  
Skill  class Desired behaviour 
C
ollect’m
 
N
o
 ob
vio
u
s
 
tend
en
cy
 
Indiv
’m
 
Say what you mean/mean what you say NEG  POS 
Convey meaning indirectly/diplomatically POS  NEG 
Able to dispel conflict 
   
Able to trust and be trusted NEG  POS 
Willing to collaborate/co-operate 
   
Communi-
cation & 
interaction 
skills 
Transparency/openness NEG  POS 
    
   
Process information rapidly 
   
Able to deal with ambiguity 
   
Able to deal with complexity 
   
Able to deal with  contradictions 
   
Able to deal with uncertainty 
   
Able to deal with incomplete information NEG  POS 
Objective analysis of technical data 
   
Prioritise information 
   
Information 
processing 
Sharing information UNCLR UNCLR POS 
    
   
Manage risks 
   
Able to deal with new information 
   
Able to deal with variable time pressures 
   
Willing to take decisions NEG  POS 
Will follow orders and CONOPS POS  NEG 
Able to act autonomously NEG  POS 
Decision 
making 
Recognises mistakes/takes action NEG  POS 
    
   
Demands/inspires unquestioning loyalty POS  NEG 
Encourages constructive criticism/input 
   
Able to motivate others 
   
Able to direct others 
   
Able to accept consequ's of decisions NEG  POS 
Able to delegate 
   
Leadership 
skills 
Able to engender trust NEG  POS 
    
   
Willing to take risks NEG  POS 
Able to manage or balance risk 
   
Able to self-organise, reconfigure NEG  POS 
Able to think laterally NEG  POS 
Innovation 
Capable of learning from action/result 
   
    
   
Physical orientation from external cues 
   
Cognitive orientation from external cues 
   
Social orientation from external cues POS  NEG 
Develop a strategic/tactical overview 
   
Situational 
awareness 
Able to assess implications of situation 
   
    
   
High robustness 
   
High resilience 
   
High responsiveness 
   
High flexibility 
   
Adaptability 
High adaptability NEG  POS 
    
   
Cognitive preparedness 
   Error 
managem’t Flexibility in action  NEG  POS 
Table 1: Behaviors 
 As this paper is published in monochrome, the green, 
amber and red colors in Tables 1, 2 and 3 have been 
replaced with the words POS, UNCLR (unclear) and NEG. 
Impact of cultural attribute values on the ability to 
perform in particular environments 
It is obvious that military environments vary considerably 
in terms of climate, terrain, etc.  The cultural context, 
within which military operations take place, also varies. 
 As stated earlier, agents or systems exhibiting certain 
positions on the cultural attribute pairings will inhibit or 
facilitate agent or system performance in an environmental 
context exhibiting certain characteristics.  For example, if 
the degree of uncertainty is considered to be ‘fuzzy role 
and task definition’, then a system position towards the 
orthodox end of the orthodox vs. proactive pairing will be 
detrimental.  Table 2 shows the current set of environ-
mental characteristics, with the corresponding scores for 
one of the cultural attribute pairings. 
Environ-
ment  class Class characteristics 
C
ollec
-
tivism
 
N
o
 
ob
vio
u
s
 
tend
en
cy
 
Individ
-
u
alism
 
Centralised Structure POS  NEG 
Decentralised Structure NEG  POS 
Authoritative/interventionist     
Collaborative/control free POS UNCLR  UNCLR 
Formal communication structure    
Informal communication structure    
Strong directive leadership    
Command 
structure and 
style 
Consensus based leadership POS POS UNCLR 
      
Stove-piped function distribution POS  NEG 
Dispersed function distribution NEG  POS 
Centralised authority over actions POS  NEG 
Delegated authority over actions NEG  POS 
Specialist skill set available    
Function/ 
authority/ 
skills 
distribution 
Multi-skilling predominates    
       
Largely heterogeneous systems NEG  POS 
Largely homogenous systems    
Largely heterogeneous SOPs    
Degree of 
inter-
operability Largely homogenous SOPs    
       
Clear role and task definition    
Fuzzy role and task definition    
Defined rules of engagement    
Broader rules of engagement    
Small well defined battle space    
Degree of 
uncertainty 
and risk 
Large unbounded battle space NEG  POS 
       
Predictable POS UNCLR UNCLR 
Unpredictable UNCLR  UNCLR POS 
Reasonably static POS UNCLR UNCLR 
Operation 
Tempo 
Rapid changes NEG UNCLR POS 
       
Long horizon POS  UNCLR 
Short horizon NEG  POS 
Ad hoc NEG  POS 
Decision 
making 
Preconceived POS    UNCLR 
Table 2: Environmental characteristics 
 As described earlier for the behavior scores, the analysis 
engine compares the values input for each cultural attribute 
and evaluates them against each of the environmental 
characteristics (see Table 2), and applies a similar scoring 
system.  For example, a score on the proactive side of the 
orthodox/proactive pairing scale would indicate that the 
system will perform poorly in a highly centralized struc-
ture, but will potentially perform well in an environment 
where the operational tempo is unpredictable. 
Presentation of results 
Tables 1 and 2 represent stable sets of data that provide a 
link between cultural attitude values, and (1) behaviors, (2) 
environment (or mission) characteristics.  These tables, 
although not yet in their final form, should remain rela-
tively stable, changing only due to new research findings. 
 It is not possible to show detailed results in this paper 
due to the large size of the output tables.  However, Table 
3 provides a visual example of the form of results that one 
might obtain if the SFMT data gathering tool were 
completed by a troop commander on behalf of himself, his 
troop and regiment.  The hatched rows in Table 3 represent 
behaviors that are considered unimportant for the planned 
mission, role or environment. 
Skill  
class Desired behavior 
2
nd
 L
t
.
 
S
m
ith
 
T
ro
op
 
R
egim
ent
 
Say what you mean/mean what you say POS POS UNCLR 
Convey meaning indirectly/diplomatically NEG UNCLR POS 
Dispel conflict POS POS POS 
Ability to trust and be trusted POS POS UNCLR 
Willingness to collaborate/co-operate POS UNCLR POS 
Communi-
cation & 
interaction 
skills 
Transparency/openness POS POS UNCLR 
    
   
Process information rapidly POS POS UNCLR 
Deal with ambiguity NEG UNCLR POS 
Deal with complexity UNCLR POS UNCLR 
Deal with  contradictions UNCLR UNCLR POS 
Deal with uncertainty UNCLR POS UNCLR 
Deal with incomplete information UNCLR UNCLR POS 
Objective analysis of technical data UNCLR POS POS 
Prioritize information UNCLR POS POS 
Information 
processing 
Sharing information POS POS NEG 
    
   
Manage risks UNCLR UNCLR POS 
Deal with new information UNCLR POS UNCLR 
Deal with variable time pressures UNCLR POS NEG 
Willingness to take decisions POS POS UNCLR 
Follow orders and CONOPS UNCLR UNCLR POS 
Act autonomously POS UNCLR UNCLR 
Decision 
making 
Recognize mistakes/take action UNCLR POS POS 
    
   
Demand/inspire unquestioning loyalty NEG NEG NEG 
Encourage constructive criticism/input POS POS POS 
Motivate others POS POS UNCLR 
Direct others UNCLR UNCLR UNCLR 
Accept consequences of decisions POS POS UNCLR 
Delegate authority UNCLR UNCLR UNCLR 
Leadership 
Engender trust POS POS UNCLR 
    
   
Take risks (as appropriate) POS POS UNCLR 
Manage or balance risk NEG UNCLR POS 
Can self-organize, reconfigure POS POS UNCLR 
Think laterally NEG NEG POS 
Innovation 
Learning from action/result POS POS UNCLR 
    
   
Physical orientation from external cues POS POS UNCLR 
Cognitive orientation from external cues NEG NEG NEG 
Social orientation from external cues NEG NEG NEG 
Develop a strategic/tactical overview NEG POS POS 
Situational 
awareness 
Assess implications of situation UNCLR POS POS 
    
   
Robustness POS POS POS 
Resilience POS POS POS 
Responsiveness UNCLR POS NEG 
Flexibility POS POS UNCLR 
Adaptability 
Adaptability UNCLR POS UNCLR 
    
   
Cognitive preparedness UNCLR UNCLR POS Error mgmt  
Flexibility in action  POS POS UNCLR 
Table 3:  Extract from sample analysis results for behavior 
Further work 
Following completion of the current version of the SFMT, 
it will be evaluated via a wide range of military and other 
scenarios, prior to the development of a final version and 
recommendations for additional work.  Many issues are 
still to be resolved, for example: 
• What are the optimum sets of cultural factors and 
behavioral/skill classes that achieve comprehensive-
ness without confusing overlaps? 
• Are the environmental factors too environment-specific 
to be transferable across environments? 
• Who should input the soft factor values? 
Conclusions 
Major changes are taking place in terms of the type of 
warfare that Western armies are fighting.  Whereas ten 
years ago, the expectation in the West was that the main 
threats would arise from conventional high intensity war-
fare, now it is increasingly accepted that the West will 
primarily face asymmetric, complex irregular warfare.  
 One result of the above changes is the need for better 
protection and support for ground troops, including the 
provision of increasingly sophisticated semi/autonomous 
vehicles.  A further result is the proliferation of multi-
national forces and non-governmental organizations.  
These have implications in terms of increasing cultural 
problems associated with understanding and interfacing 
with personnel and systems. 
 The SEAS DTC has supported research work at 
Loughborough University, UK on cultural factors.  This 
work has resulted in the development of a soft factors 
modeling tool (SFMT) that enables individuals’, groups’ 
and organizations’ cultures to be evaluated against behav-
ioral and environmental requirements. 
 The SFMT is still at the prototype stage and many issues 
are, as yet, unresolved.  Following completion of the 
current version, it will undergo detailed evaluation. 
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